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manifestations that are beyond the human *as defined*. It is by no means true that natural man's "intellectual life is centered on the physical existence" (p. 178), at least not in all cases, and can not be made true by definition. Interests in ideals of goodness and beauty and truth, for example, are not signs of the superhuman in man, but are manifestations of the working of man's natural equipment of instincts and habits.

The pragmatic fallacy, so common in religious literature, is not entirely avoided in the book. This fallacy consists of the failure to distinguish truth from value, or of the assertion that beliefs which are valuable must, therefore, be true. Value has one definition, and belongs to the subject-matter of the value sciences; truth means another thing and belongs to the subject-matter of logic and epistemology. There is no *a priori* reason why they should always coincide. There is, on the other hand, empirical evidence to the contrary. Many primitive religious beliefs that are obviously false have possessed definite value in the course of human evolution, and in the higher religions there are beliefs, such as some of those fostered by the Catholic church, that have value for the believers though they are probably not true. Dr. Barrow commits the pragmatic fallacy when he says, "Validity thus becomes not merely a matter of logical accuracy, but of practical value" (p. 245).

Among the chief merits of a book in philosophy or in philosophy of religion are the introduction of an original view-point and the stimulation of thought and criticism, both *pro* and *con*. *The Validity of the Religious Experience* possesses these merits in a high degree.

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Science and the Nation: Essays by Cambridge graduates with an introduction by the RIGHT HON. LORD MOULTON. Edited by A. C. SEWARD. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1917. Pp. xxii + 328.

This is a little book of popular essays concerning the work now in progress in a number of branches of science. The book apparently confesses by its rather defective binding and lack of index its own merely ephemeral character. But its purpose transcends any present emergency. That purpose is to bring to the English people a realization that the contributions which applied science makes to national defense and social well-being are not possible, save on the foundation of a highly disinterested following out of pure, theoretical science, along whatsoever pathways the latter may lead. The de-

tails of these essays are ephemeral in the sense in which the present work of science is ephemeral, striving towards the transcending of itself in the better science of to-morrow. But the main thesis of these essays will be as true to-morrow as it is to-day.

For the student of philosophy, the book contains a review of diverse fields of science in their present status, such as ought to be of considerable value. The essays which preach and draw the moral, even such an able one as that by W. H. Bragg on "Physical Research," are on the whole less effective than those which, like that by W. Rosenhain, "The Modern Science of Metals," say in effect, "Behold, this is what we have done, draw your own conclusions." Some of the essays are broad reviews of a whole science, as botany or geology or experimental medicine; indeed, that by E. W. Hobson on "Mathematics in Relation to Pure and Applied Science" attempts rather too much in the allotted space; others are on particular problems, as, for example, the interesting suggestions by W. H. R. Rivers on applied anthropology, "The Government of Subject Peoples." The only essay which reflects much of the animus of the present war is the opening one by W. J. Pope, entitled "The National Importance of Chemistry," but partly on that account it is by no means the least entertaining. Taken as a whole, these essays give as readable a review of a considerable range of contemporary science as is likely to be met with anywhere. A number of equally important lines of research, of course, get omitted altogether. But what we have here is well worth having.

The thesis of the essays is one which scarcely needs proving to the philosopher. He would admit at once the importance of the study of theory. Perhaps, rather, he would need to remind himself of a certain fortuitousness with which many of our great mechanical applications of science have supervened upon theory. Doubtless there are a hundred persons who can apply a new discovery of scientific principle to one who can make the discovery itself. But for all that, it still remains true that some of our most important inventions are exceedingly simple in themselves and require very little prior theory; the processes of manufacture in economically profitable quantities may require more application of theory than the original invention. It might, however, be even in these cases maintained that the happy accident is more apt to occur to, and bear fruit in, the mind that is well-grounded in scientific theory.

The thesis of this book might well lead us to another line of thought which is well worthy of our attention in these days of discussion about social reconstruction. The economic reward which comes to the pure scientist bears no such ratio to the good done the community as does that of the successful lawyer or business man.

The question is not solved by saying the pursuit of truth is its own reward; the question is not an individual one about the minimum reward the scientist can get along with, but a social one as to what the society can do for society's sake. The social justice here called for is the putting into practise the principle that society ought, for the good of all her members, to make use to the best advantage of the available brain-power of her members; and this result will not be achieved so long as dazzlingly greater rewards are held out before the ablest young men, attracting them to go into professions whose functions are, whatever the chance for originality in detail, in the broad outlines routine and regulative, than are held out before them as incentives to enter upon a career of creation and discovery that may leave its mark on the whole future history of the race. The solution of this problem is far from easy. He who discovers a new scientific law ought to receive a royalty on its applications, but no present patent system could possibly achieve this end; and he who gives us, like Copernicus, what is, as it were, a new heaven and a new earth, deserves a reward far beyond that accruing from any applications of science whatsoever.

The reviewer had another query come to him as he read this book, *Science and the Nation*. Suppose philosophers were asked to write a similar book, *Philosophy and the Nation*, telling what philosophy is doing just now. What could we philosophers say? We could say that though now, more than ever before, the world is crying out and pleading for a new, better, broader, more adequate philosophy, philosophers have had very little to offer; that most of us have been almost as narrow-minded as the common herd of people, and some of us more so, including among the latter some who feel a pride in their own impartiality; that our thoughts have been meager and critical when they needed to be massive and constructive. Like other salaried men who could not threaten to strike for higher wages, philosophy professors have recently come a little nearer the verge of starvation; but unlike other salaried men, they have not been altogether undeserving of their fate.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. September, 1917. *Philosophy in France*, 1916 (pp. 459-476) : ANDRÉ LALANDE. - Examines the influence of the war on contemporary morality and its probable influence on the moral life of the future. Analyzes *Le problème de la mort et la conscience universelle* by Le Dantec. Notes the death of Delbos and Ribot. *Purpose as Tendency and Adaptation* (pp.